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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20010039-CA 
v. : 
JOHN W. BANGERTER : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a-b) (Supp. 
2000), in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Washington County, the Honorable G. 
Rand Beacham, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this case under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the search 
warrant was supported by probable cause? 
The reviewing court does not conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's probable 
cause determination on a search warrant. State v Babbell 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989) 
{citingIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)). In reviewing a search warrant, the 
court "give[s] 'great deference' to the magistrate's decision" and "will find the warrant 
invalid only if the magistrate, given the totality of the circumstances, lacked a 'substantial 
basis' for determining that probable cause existed/' State v T/uirmatL 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-
60 (Utah 1993) {quoting Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991). Indeed, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment's strong preference for warrant-supported searches, the reviewing court does 
not engage in a hypertechnical, but rather a common sense evaluation of the probable cause 
ruling. Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 and United States v Ventresca,3S0U.S. 102, 108 
(1965)). The resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should therefore be determined in 
accord with this preference. Id. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly recognized that the magistrate was not required 
to make a finding before issuing the search warrant that evidence of defendant's illegal 
conduct could not first be obtained by a subpoena? 
The trial court's interpretation and application of a statute in accorded no deference 
and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah App. 1998). 
3. Whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for issuing the warrant with no-
knock, nighttime authority? 
"When [the appellate] court reviews an affidavit authorizing no-knock entry, [it does] 
so in a common sense manner, viewing its contents as a whole." State v Rosenbaunu 845 
P.2d 962, 965 (Utah App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following determinative constitutional provisions and statutes are 
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determinative of this case: 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann, § 77-23-203 (1999) - Conditions precedent to issuance. 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation particularly describing the person or place to be searched 
and fhe person, property, or evidence to be seized. 
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in the 
possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause 
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the 
alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by 
the magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by 
subpoena, or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or 
altered if sought by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant 
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that 
reasonably afford protection of the following interests of the person or entity 
in possession of such evidence: 
(a) protection against unreasonable interference with normal business; 
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential sources of 
information; or 
(c) protection against prior or direct restraints on constitutionally protected rights. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (1999) - Force used in executing warrant -
When notice of authority is required as a prerequisite. 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any 
building, room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer 
executing the warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or 
he is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing 
the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the 
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical 
harm may result to any person if notice were given. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, John W. Bangerter, was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
2000), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (Supp. 2000) (R. 1-2). Both offenses were enhanced, as stated, 
because they were committed within 1000 feet of a prohibited area or with a person younger 
than eighteen years of age, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(i-x) (Supp. 2000) 
(R. 1-2). 
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on both charges (R. 49-
50). Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a search w arrant 
(R. 55-66). Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 93-101; 136:1-27) 
Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, reduced to a third degree 
felony, conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress (R. 114-15). 
The trial court found defendant guilty of the offense, but stayed imposition of the sentence, 
placing defendant on probation for thirty-six months (R. 121-24). Defendant timeU 
appealed (R. 127). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In February 2000, Detective Chris Trani had been employed by St. George Police 
Department for seven years and had extensive training and experience in narcotics 
investigations (R. 5). In the week prior to February' 3, 2000, the Washington County Drug 
Task Force began receiving information from several sources concerning ongoing 
methamphetamine use and manufacture in defendant's residence (R. 6). Based on that 
information, on February 3,2000, Detective Trani drafted an affidavit in support of a warrant 
to search defendant's residence, outbuildings, and the persons of defendant and Grant Justin 
Bangerter (Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant, R. 5-10, attached at Addendum A): 
Affidavit in support of search warrant: 
Information from Confidential Source #/ 
Confidential source #1 (CS#1) told the detective on February 3, 2000 that another 
"very close" source ("SI") told him that she was in the Bangerter residence on January 29, 
2000 (R. 6).1 There she saw defendant, Grant Justin Bangerter, and other people, smoking 
''glass," a smokeable form of crystal methamphetamine (R. 6). She also told CS#1 that on 
the same occasion she saw a Kyle Cornwell at the Bangerter residence (R. 6). 
1
 Detective Trani disguised the identity of his confidential sources and their 
secondary sources by referring to them in the first person plural, thereby avoiding the 
pronouns "he" and "she" (R. 6-8). Notwithstanding that the sex of the various informants 
is thereby unknown, in this brief the State has used the masculine form in referring to the 
detective's confidential informants, CS#1 and CS^2, and the feminine form in referring to 
the confidential informants' sources, for the sake of clarity and readability. 
> 
CS=f Ts second source ("S2") reported being "very close" to defendant's famiK (R. 
6). She told CS#1 that she had been in defendant's residence when a "methamphetamine 
cook" took place in the kitchen area (R. 6-7). She also reported to CSffl that she became 
scared and left the residence. She also reported that there was 'fca lot" of paraphernalia 
throughout the residence (R. 6). 
CS#1 reported to Detective Trani that when Kyle Cornwell is at the residence a 
methamphetamine cook takes place, but that he did not either bring the equipment or leave 
with it (R. 7). 
Information from Confidential Source #2 
Detective Trani asserted that CS#2 is a source completely independent of CS#1 (R. 
7). CS#2 told Detective Randall that he suspected that there was a methamphetamine lab 
concealed in the trunk of a car driven by a Delanie Drake and Kenyon Staheli (R. 7). CS-2 
said he believed the items he saw in the trunk constituted a methamphetamine lab because 
he had been reading about drugs and drug labs, he knew Delanie, and he knew she was 
involved with drugs (R. 7). The items CS#2 described seeing in the trunk were some tubing, 
red phosphorus, muriatic acid, a coffee decanter with stains on it, several containers of 
unknown liquids, items that appeared to be flasks, and other items wrapped in grocery bags 
and masking tape (R. 7). There was also some clothing which smelled strongly of urine (R. 
7). CS#2 told Detective Randall that Delanie's father removed the items from the car and 
discarded them after Staheli had been arrested while driving the car (R. 7). 
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CSf?2 also told Detective Randall that Delanie was a frequent visitor to defendant ^ 
residence He also said that Delanie hung around Kyle Cornwell, who also could frequentlv 
be found at defendant's residence (R 7) 
Detectne s Investigation and Confirmation of Informants reports 
Detectives Randall and Tram spoke with Delame's father (R. 7) He said that the 
items in the trunk belonged to him, and that after the vehicle was released to him he cleaned 
it out (R. 7). Among the items he discarded were a coffee pot, some tubing and a jug of 
liquid that might have been iodine. He did not recall any other items (R. 7). He threw the 
items into the garbage, which was picked up and taken away (R. 7). With Mr. Drake s 
consent, the detectives looked into the trunk, but they did not locate any contraband (R 7) 
However, Detective Randall detected the odor and "sensations in her mouth" that she 
associated with a methamphetamme lab (R 7). Mr Drake then told the detectives what 
vehicle Delanie and Kenyon were driving that night, February 2, 2002. 
Detectives' Direct Observations 
At about 11:30 pm on February 2, 2002, the detectives located the vehicle described 
by Mr. Drake at defendant's residence, where it remained until after 2 00 am (R 7) While 
the detectives conducted surveillance, another \ ehicle stopped at defendant's residence The 
front seat passenger was Eric Fjermestad, know n to the detectives to be inv olv ed in the local 
drug culture (R. 7). 
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Additional Information Alleged in Support of Probable Cause 
(1) Detective Trani has extensive training and lengthy experience as a police officer 
knowledgeable of drug and methamphetamine use, manufacture, and distribution among 
gangs and street users (R. 5). Based on his training and experience, Detective Tram 
concluded that the items described to him and Detective Randall by CS#1, CS#2, and Mr. 
Drake were consistent with the clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 8). 
(2) Kyle Cornwell is a well-known figure in the local drug culture as a 
methamphetamine cook who had been investigated more than once in connection with 
methamphetamine manufacture in both Utah and Nevada (R. 8). 
(3) Kenyon Staheli was also "on the periphery" of an investigation in which 
methamphetamine manufacture was suspected (R. 8). 
(4) Both defendant and Grant Bangerter had been investigated for or were suspected 
of being involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 8). 
(5) On November 29, 1999, defendant was stopped while leaving his residence in the 
company of a Shirl Shane Johnson, in whose truck officer's found several cases of book 
matches (R. 8). Matches can be used to make methamphetamine (R. 8). When found w ith 
the matches, Johnson said to officers, "They are not for what you think" (R. 8). Johnson also 
said he had gotten them from a female whose last name was Gubler. The owner of the motel 
from which the matches came said he suspected that Ms. Gubler was inv olv ed with drugs (R. 
8). 
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(6) CSf*l has previously proven himself to be reliable. He independently came 
forward with his information without asking for anything in return (R. 8). 
(7)CS#2 is personally known to Detective Randall. He came forward as a concerned 
citizen, had never before provided information to the police, was not involved in the drug 
culture, and had no reason known to Detective Tram to provide false information (R 8) 
(8) Neither CS#1 nor CS#2 was compensated m any way for their information or 
assistance in this case (R. 8). 
Based on his belief that the information he received constituted probable cause to 
search defendant's property for methamphetamine, methamphetamine paraphernalia and 
laboratory equipment, chemicals related to methamphetamine manufacture, and any records 
related to the purchase and possession of those items, Detective Tram sought a search 
warrant (R. 5, 9). The affidavit also sought authonty to search for residency papers, 
currency, photographic and audio records, and weapons and firearms (R. 10, "Attachment 
C-2") The affidavit also requested no-knock, nighttime authonty, based on a concern for 
the safety of officers, suspects, and bystanders, and because controlled substances could 
easily be destroyed, concealed, or removed from the premises and because unknown 
chemical substances presented a potentially deadly hazard (R. 9). 
Magistrate's granting of warrant and subsequent search 
On the evening of February 3, the affidavit was presented to the magistrate, and the 
warrant issued forthwith (R. 9, 11) The warrant authonzed the search of defendant ^ 
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specified residence, other locations, and the persons of defendant and Grant Justin 
Bangerter, for the items specified in the affidavit and attachment C-2 (Search Warrant, R. 
11-13, attached at Addendum B). 
The warrant was executed in the early morning of February 8, 2000 (R. 14). The 
search recovered baggies and bindles of suspected methamphetamine and marijuana, drug 
paraphernalia, chemicals, a 12-gauge shotgun, and defendant's library card (Property 
Inventory, Receipt, and Return, R. 15-17, attached at Addendum C). 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the execution of the warrant (R. 
55). At the hearing, the parties presented no evidence and limited their arguments to the 
facts set out in the affidavit (R. 136). The trial court denied defendant's motion and issued 
a detailed ruling setting out findings of fact and conclusions of law (Ruling on Motion to 
Quash Search Warrant and Suppress Evidence, R. 93-101, attached at Addendum D). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Court should decline to consider defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
magistrate's probable cause determination because he has failed to consider the statements 
in the affidavit under the totality-of-the-circumstances test. In any case, the affidav it alleges 
sufficient probable cause to support the search warrant. The detective received information 
from two sources who personally observed defendant use methamphetamine and play host 
to its manufacture. The detective received this information through an informant. The 
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detective also directlv received additional information about defendant's involvement with 
methamphetamine from another informant The reliability of all the reports is established 
by the status of the informants as intrinsically reliable and the mutual consistency ot their 
reports Further, the detectives sufficiently confirmed the information they receiv ed through 
personal investigation, which revealed that defendant was engaged in on-going illegal 
conduct. Even if the affidavit was technically deficient, the detectives relied in good faith 
on the search warrant because the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cau^e 
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. 
POINT II 
The magistrate was not required to make a finding that evidence sought by a search 
warrant was not first available through a subpoena The statute requires such a finding onlv 
when the "item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct [and] is in the possession 
of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause . to believe that such 
person or entity is a party to the alleged illegal conduct/' Since the affidavit in this case set 
out sufficient probable cause that defendant was involved in illegal conduct, the statute did 
not apply and, consequently, no such finding was required. 
POIM III 
The magistrate correctly issued the warrant with no-knock authority Viewed in a 
common sense fashion, the affidavit articulated substantial grounds for believing that 
narcotics likely to be found on the premises would be destroved or concealed and officers 
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would be put at risk if notice were given The affidavit, referencing the officer's substantial 
training and expenence with narcotics trafficking and street gangs, stated that controlled 
substances could be easily destroyed or hidden and could be used with deadly force against 
police. It also stated that defendant had a history of violence, including threats to law 
enforcement, that he was the leader of a local skinhead group, that he w ould kill police w horn 
he believed where infringing on his constitutional nghts, and that he had been known to 
fortify his dwellings to prevent police from executing a search warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MAGISTRATE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR 
CONCLUDING THAT THE SEARCH W ARRANT WAS SUPPORTED 
BY PROBABLE CAUSE 
Defendant first claims that the affidavit lacked probable cause to support the search 
warrant. In support of his claim, defendant pnmanly argues that the affidavit failed to 
establish the reliability of any of the informants, that much of the information provided was 
double hearsay, that the information the informants provided lacked a time frame and was 
therefore probably stale, and that much of the information was irrelevant to establishing 
probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 6- 12. Additionally, defendant claims the affidavit failed to 
identify him with the premises sought to be searched, that it contained stale information, and 
that it lacked particulanty by reciting a "laundry list" of items to be searched for Aplt Br 
at 7-8, 10 
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In attacking the affidav it paragraph by paragraph, defendant has failed to analyze the 
affidavit under the totality of circumstances, the standard uniformly applied by Ltah 
appellate courts. More particularly, defendant's atomizing approach to the affidav it fails to 
acknowledge the substantial, cross-referencing information that identified and mutually 
corroborated the informants' direct observations of defendant's on-going criminal activ it\, 
which the affiant-officer largely confirmed through personal investigation. Consequently, 
defendant fails to recognize that the affidav it establishes the reliability of the informants and 
defeats any claim that the information was stale Defendant's ancillary claims, that the 
affidavit failed to adequately identify him with the premises and that it lacked particularity, 
fail on a common sense reading of the affidavit and the law. 
Because defendant has entirely failed to apply the totahty-of-the-circumstances test 
in assessing both the magistrate's and trial court's determination of probable cause, this 
Court should decline to consider defendant's claim. In any event, the affidavit states 
sufficient probable cause to support the search warrant. Even if the affidavit lacked 
sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant, the officer's search was 
justified under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
A. This Court Should Decline to Consider Defendant's 
Challenge Because He has Failed to Assess Probable 
Cause under the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test. 
"it is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not 
adequately briefed." State v Thomas, 961 P 2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) (citing Stare \ 
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IVareham, 111 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on issue where defendant's brief 
"wholly lacked legal analysis and authority to support his argument")); (also citing State v 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule on separation of powers 
argument where argument was not supported by any legal analysis or authority)). *"[A] 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and 
is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument 
and research.'"State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2,«111,974 P.2d 269 (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 
P.2d439, 450 (Utah 1988)). See also rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(requiring party to adequately set forth an argument). 
By entirely failing to apply governing law to his principal challenge on appeal, that 
the affidavit in support of the search warrant was based on information supplied by unreliable 
informants, defendant has failed to adequately brief his claim of error. As more fully set out 
below, the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a search warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment is assessed by the magistrate in a common-sense fashion under the "total lty-of-
the-circumstances." State v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017,1019 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332-33 (1983)). In moving to suppress 
evidence seized in the search of his residence, defendant presented a wholly fragmented 
picture of the information set out in the affidavit, completely disregarding the well-
established standard by which the magistrate assesses probable cause (R. 57-62). In denving 
the motion, the trial court observed that "the facts relevant to Defendant's motions are those 
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stated in Detective Tram's affidavit and must be considered in the 'totalitv or the 
circumstances/ and not in a piece-meal fashion as argued by Defendants" (R 94) The 
court also later stated, "Defendants dissect the atfidavit. paragraph by paragraph, an argue 
that each portion is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause" (R 97) Recognizing 
that the magistrate was obligated to consider the totality-of-the-circumstances, the court 
stated: 
Although the confidential informants did rely on information from other 
persons, the reliability of the confidential informants is adequately established 
in the affidavit. Furthermore, Defendants have identified no precedent for the 
proposition than an otherwise reliable confidential informant cannot be relied 
upon for any information except that personally observed by the confidential 
informant. The confidential informants1 veracity and reliability were 
adequately stated in the affidavit, one from past experience and the other as "a 
concerned citizen," so that their reliability could be assumed, and each of these 
reliable informants made reasonable statements about the reliability of the 
sources of their own information. Furthermore, some of the information given 
by them was confirmed or corroborated by the detective's own investigation 
This Court finds that the magistrate had a substantial basis for relying on the 
information from the confidential informants in the affidavit. 
(R. 97-98). 
Notwithstanding the tnal court's admonition for his "dissecting]" the affidavit in 
*
fcpiece-meal fashion," defendant on appeal presents the same argument almost verbatim 
\plt. Br at 4-12. Defendant presents no authority to assist this Court in determining the 
reliability of the confidential informants or their sources Except to assert that the paragraph 
The tnal court's reference to "defendants" includes defendant Grant Justin 
Bangerter, whose case was not severed from defendant's and who joined in defendant 
motion (R 93, 136 3, 16-18) 
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asserting the reliability of the confidential informants is "conclusory," see Aplt. Br. at 10, 
defendant entirely fails to consider how the lengthy affidavit as a whole establishes the 
informant's reliability and probable cause. Because defendant has failed to adequately apply 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test or to cite any relevant authority in support of his claim 
that the affidavit failed to establish the informant's reliability, this Court should decline to 
consider defendant's argument. In any event, defendant's claim is without merit.3 
B. Probable Cause is Assessed under the Totality of the Circumstances. 
Probable cause arises from "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life 
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 241, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2333 (1983). Accordingly, "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate 
is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances 
set forth in the affidavit before him,... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence 
of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332; State v. 
Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah App. 1993) (applying the Gates totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis standard to probable cause determinations). 
3
 Defendant also alleges in his "Conclusion" that the search warrant violated the 
Utah Constitution, as well as the United States Constitution. Aplt. Br. at 19. Howc\er, 
because defendant has failed to discuss a separate application of the state constitution at 
any point in his brief, this Court need not consider the matter. State v. Davis * 972 P.2d 
388, 392 (Utah 1998) (declining to consider state constitutional claim on appeal where the 
defendant "has not adequately set forth any separate legal analysis and has not otherwise 
suggested a reason that warrants a distinct analytical treatment under the Utah 
Constitution"). 
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Although the basis of the informant's knowledge and the informant's reliability aie 
relevant factors in determining probable cause under the totality of the circumstances, they 
are no longer rigid prerequisites to a prooable cause determination as thev were treated in 
decisions prior to Gates 462 U S. at 233, 103 S. Ct. at 2329. As observed by the Supreme 
Court in Gates, "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall 
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of 
reliability." Id. at 229-30 & n. 4, 103 S. Ct. at 2327-28 & n. 4 (emphasis added). 
On appeal, this Court pays "great deference" to the magistrate's finding of probable 
cause. State \ Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Ltah App 1991); accord State v Hansen, 732 
P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). Accordingly, "after-the-fact scrutiny . . . should not take the 
form of de novo review." Gates, 462 U S at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331. The appellate court's 
deference to the magistrate is due in large measure to "the Fourth Amendment's strong 
preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." Id.; accord Weaver, 817 P 2d at 
833. Given this preference for the warrant process, appellate courts will not invalidate a 
search warrant so long as "the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for concluding]' that 
probable cause existed" to conduct a search Id at 238-39, 103 S Ct at 2332 (quoting Jones 
v United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80S Ct ^25, 736 (I960)). 
C. The Search Warrant was Supported by Probable Cause. 
Defendant's central challenge to the affidav it drafted by Detective Tram is that it fails 
to establish the reliability of the confidential informants and their sources Aplt Br at 6, 10 
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Defendant correctly recognizes that although Gates "expressly abandoned application ot the 
previously used, hypertechnical, Aguilar-Spinelh *two-pronged test,' and embraced a 
ktotahty-of -the-circumstances test'..., Ltah courts, however, have used the Aguilar-Spinelh 
factors as guides in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test." Singleton, 854 P 2d at 
1019-20.4 Aplt. Br. at 4-5. Nonetheless, the Aguilar-Spinelh guidelines are clearly 
circumscribed by the totality- of-the-circumstances test: 
k
'An informant's 'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' are but two relevant 
considerations, among others, in determining the existence of probable cause 
under 'a totahty-of-the circumstances '" Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 (citing 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36, 103 S Ct at 2328-31). See also State v 
Parser, 828 P 2d 515, 517 (Utah App 1992) The Aguilar-Spinelh guidelines 
are not applied as "strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly exacted' in 
every case. A weakness in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so long 
as m the totality there is substantial basis to find probable cause." Hansen, 732 
P.2d at 130 (citing Gates, 462 U S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332). Thus, the 
significance of each factor involved in a finding of probable cause differs on 
a case-by-case basis. See id.; Purser, 828 P 2d at 517. 
A search warrant may be issued when, under the 
totality-of-the-circumstances, the information given by multiple confidential 
informants is sufficient to establish probable cause. This is true even if an 
individual informant's information would not establish probable cause if 
considered separately See State v Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205-06 (Utah 
1984); Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. [Emphasis added]. 
Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1020. Cf State v Trujillo. 854 P 2d 603, 607 (Utah App. 1993) ("In 
4
 SeeSpinelliv United States, 393 I S 410, 89 S Ct. 584 (1969), Aguilar v 
Texas, 378 U S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509 (1964) The two-prong test required the affidavit to 
set forth sufficient underlying circumstances to establish both (1) the basis of knowledge 
of the informant, and (2) the informant's veracity and reliability See Gates, 462 U S at 
228-29. 103 S Ct. at 2327. 
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other circumstances, howev er, *a less strong show ing of the basis of the affiant's know ledge 
veracity and reliability may be required, if the circumstances as a whole indicate that the 
informant's report is truthful.'") (quoting Bailex, 6"5 P 2d at 1205-06) 
Since the information in support of the warrant in this case came mainly from 
Detective Tram's confidential informants and their sources, this Court should analvze the 
sufficiency of the affidavit by considenng three factors. (1) the type of tip or informant 
involved, (2) whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activ ity 
to support a [warrant], and (3) whether the police officer independently confirmed the 
informant's information. State v Deluna, 2001 LT App 401, <fi[l 1, 19, 20, 40 P 3d 1146 
(citing Kaysville City v Mulcahy, 943 P 2d 231, 235-36 (Utah App. 1997)). See State \ 
Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,1fl[ 16-17, 37 P 3d 260 (extending application of Mulcaln 
factors to probable cause determinations). 
/. The informants' reliability was fully established by their 
status as informants who had given reliable information 
in the past or as citizens, and by their mutual confirmation 
of defendant's on-going criminal activity. 
The adequacy of the affidavit stems from the informants' multiple reports, 
individually insufficient, but collectively sufficient to establish probable cause and the 
reliability of the confidential informants and their sources See Singleton, 854 P 2d at 1020-
21 (upholding probable cause determination founded mainly on information from one 
confidential informant who witnessed the drug transaction, which was corroborated b> 
information from three other informants that secondarily indicated that defendant wa^  
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involved with drugs, including the defendant's use of a pager as primary informant had 
described), State v Trujillo* 854 P 2d at 607-08 (upholding probable cause on information 
supplied by informant known to detective that defendant w as present during controlled buvs, 
bolstered by additional reports from two other informants that other known drug dealers 
were residing with defendant, and detective's personal observation of narcotics in the 
defendant's residence one year earlier) 
Specifically, Detective Tram's confidential informants, CS#1 acted mainly as a 
conduit of reports from secondary sources, SI and S2, who directly observed defendant's 
criminal activity, and both CS#1 and CS#2 provided additional information helping to 
establish that defendant was connected with on-going methamphetamine use and 
manufacture in his residence. The affidavit sets out facts expressly stating the reliability of 
CS#1 and CS#2 (R. 8) The reliability of SI and S2, whose observations were central to 
establishing probable cause, stems from the information they provided, which was fully 
consistent with information independently provided by multiple sources, including CS#1, 
CS#2, Delanie Drake's father, and Detective Tram, through his investigation and recitation 
of defendant's drug affiliations. Thus, taken as a whole, the affidavit simultaneouslv 
establishes the reliability of all the informants and probable cause that evidence ot 
methamphetamine use and manufacture would be found on defendant's premises Indeed, 
the sufficiency of the affidavit can only be appreciated when looked at as a whole 
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Reliability ofCS4! and CS#2 
Defendant challenges the reliability of Detective Tram's two primary informants. 
CSffl and CS#2, without acknowledging statements supporting their reliability Aplt Br at 
6,10 Similarly, defendant fails to respond to the trial court's finding that "[t]he confidential 
informants' veracity and reliability were adequately stated in the affidavit, one from past 
expenence and the other as "a concerned citizen," so that their reliability could be assumed 
(R. 97). At the end of the section in the affidav it, "Additional Probable Cause," the affidav it 
states: 
CS#1 has proven [himself] to be reliable to the Task Force in the past To 
reveal their identity would endanger them and ruin their future usefulness, 
[sic] further this source came to us and asked for nothing in return for 
providing us with the information CSnl is personally known by Det 
Randall. This person also came to Det Randall as a concerned citizen 
although, [sic] this person has never prov ided information m the past, they are 
not involved in the drug culture and have no reason to provide us with false 
information Neither source is being compensated in any way for their 
information or assistance in this case 
(R. 8). 
Case law consistently recognizes that informants such as CS# 1 and CS#2 are reliable 
See State v Doxle, 918 P 2d 141, 144 (Utah App ) (recognizing reliability of confidential 
informant who had provided the police with reliable information in the past), cert denied, 
925 P 2d 963 (Utah 1996). Bailey, 675 P 2d at 1205-06 (finding reliable identified citizen 
informant who voluntarily offered information in instant case, who lacked a criminal record, 
and who had given reliable information in the past), \lulcah\% 943 P 2d at 235 ("Wesimplv 
21 
assume veracity when a citizen-informant provides information as a victim or witness of 
cnme 'because citizen informers, unlike police informers, volunteer information out of 
concern for the community and not for personal benefit/") (citing State v Miller, 740 P 2d 
1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), and quoting Statev Brown, 798 P 2d 284, 286 (Utah App 
1998)); Purser, 828 P 2d at 517 (finding reliability of a confidential informant substantially 
established, even though affidavit did not indicate that he had been previously reliable, where 
informant volunteered information to police and did not receive anything in exchange) Ev en 
if CS#1 is a police informant, and would thereby be 'Mower on the reliability scale than a 
citizen-informant," see, eg, Mulcahy, 943 P 2d at 235 n 2, his having come forward 
voluntarily without expectation or receipt of reward sufficiently established his reliability. 
See State v Vigh, 871 P 2d 1030, (Utah App 1994) ("Because the confidential informant 
here received nothing in exchange for information about Vigh's illegal activities, the 
magistrate properly assumed that the informant was reliable.") Further, CS#T s and CS#2,s 
reports, as discussed below, were substantially corroborated by the observations of SI, S2, 
Delame Drake's father and Detective Tram of defendant's involvement with 
methamphetamine. 
Reliability of SI and S2 
Central to the establishment of probable cause, however, were Si's and S2's reports 
of defendant's cnminal activity. CS#l reported to Detective Tram that he received 
information from two sources, one "very close" to him (SI) and the other "very close to 
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[defendant's] family" (S2) (R. 6). SI told CS~1 that she was in defendant's residence on 
January 29, 2000 (R. 6). There she saw defendant. Grant Justin Bangerter, and other people, 
smoking "'glass/" a smokeable form of crystal methamphetamme (R. 6). She also told CS~1 
that on the same occasion she saw a Kyle Cornwell at the Bangerter residence (R. 6) S2 
reported to CS#1 that she also had been in defendant's residence when a methamphetamme 
cook took place in the kitchen area and that there was "a lot" of paraphernalia throughout the 
residence (R. 6-7). 
Defendant does not dispute that the first-hand observations made by SI and S2 are 
of a type sufficient to establish probable cause See Deluna 2001 LT App 401 at ^12-13 
(report of family member that she had witnessed the defendant manufacture 
methamphetamme at the apartment several times during the past two weeks were personal 
observations, "which satisfies the basis-of-know ledge component of the totahty-of-the-
circumstances test/') (quoting Purser, 828 P 2d at 517). Rather defendant apparently 
argues that because their reports are "double hearsay/' that automatically vitiates their 
reliability, which is not established elsewhere in the affidavit. Aplt. Br. at 6. 
Contrary to defendant's apparent argument, it is well established that reliable multiple 
hearsay may support a probable cause determination. "The use of hearsay evidence to 
establish probable cause does not necessarily undercut the validity of a warrant If the 
hearsay is reliable, and there is a substantial basis for giving it credence, it will support the 
issuance of a warrant/' State v Nielsen, 111 P 2d 188, 191-92 (Utah 1986), cert denied',480 
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L S 930 (1987) (accepting double hearsay between police officers, assumed to be reliable) 
See also Blaha, 851 P 2d at 1208 (probable cause established on informant's report to police 
officer based on family member's information, recognized as reliable out of informant's 
concern for family member); Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, [^14 (double hearsay source 
considered reliable because information nsked implicating another family member in 
criminal conduct); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment § 3 2(d), at 50, 50 n.l 16 (3d ed. 1996) ("Even hearsay-upon-hearsay may be 
utilized to show probable cause."). The crucial issue is whether each level of hearsay is 
reliable. 
Si's and S2's reliability was based on multiple factors, which further assist in 
establishing probable cause. First, defendant fails to recognize that CS#1 "made reasonable 
statements about the reliability of the sources of [his] information" (R. 97). Specifically, the 
tnal court recognized what appears probable from the affidavit, viewed in a common sense 
manner, was that S1 and S2 did not appear to be paid informants who had received anything 
for their information, that S2 was evidently a close friend, if not a family member, of 
defendant, and that they had evidently volunteered their information to CS#1. See Deluna* 
2001 UT App 401, f 14; Mulcahy, 943 P 2d at 235 
More importantly, Si's and S2's reports were confirmed by other sources' 
information, all of which described an on-going pattern of methamphetamine use and 
manufacture at defendant's residence. First, CS#1 independently reported that when Kvle 
24 
C ornw ell w as at defendant's residence, "there is a methamphetamine cook taking place ' ( R 
7). Not only does this information corroborate the reports of methamphetamine use and 
manufacture of both SI and S2 at defendant's residence, it also identifies the 
methamphetamine cook whom defendant is hosting. Defendant argues that the affidav it fails 
to state that CS#1 was ever in defendant's home or how he learned of the information he 
reported. Aplt. Br. at 6. However, the affidavit states: *WCS#1 was asked if Mr. Cornwell 
brought the lab equipment to the residence. We were told that he did not bnng the 
equipment, nor did he leave with it" (R. 7). A common sense reading of the exchange 
between the detectives and CS# 1 is that CS# 1 responded to the detectiv es based on personal 
observation. CS#1 reported that he had received information from two sources about w hat 
was going on in defendant's residence. It seems probable that if his answer to the 
detective's question was based on some other source's information, he would have similarly 
referred to that other source. Additionally, CS# l's answer provided information about how 
the methamphetamine cooks at defendant's residence were likely conducted, that is, the 
methamphetamine cooking equipment was probably not kept on the premises, that the 
equipment was earned to defendant's residence by yet other third parties, and that Kyle 
Cornwell appeared for the specific purpose of doing the "cook." Defendant faiU to 
acknowledge the significance of this information, as corroborative information in itself and 
as information that explained how Delanie Drake's activities helped establish further 
probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 7-9 
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Contrary to defendant's argument, CS^2 's information about Delanie Drake partially 
confirmed the information provided by CS# 1, S1, and S2, and further helped establish how 
the methamphetamine cook was being conducted and who else was involved. CSf^ 2 told 
Detective Randall that he knew Delanie Drake and that she was involved in drugs (R. 7). 
He saw hidden in the trunk of a car Delanie and a Kenyon Staheli were driving items that 
he thought comprised a methamphetamine lab. The items CS#2 described seeing in the trunk 
were some tubing, red phosphorus, munatic acid, a coffee decanter with stains on it, several 
containers of unknown liquids, items that appeared to be flasks, and other items wrapped in 
grocery bags and masking tape (R. 7). There was also some clothing which smelled strongly 
like urine, a smell which Detective Randall evidently associated with methamphetamine 
methamphetamine manufacture (R. 7). CS#2 told Detective Randall that Delanie1 s father 
removed the items from the car and discarded them after Staheli had been arrested while 
driving the car (R. 7). CS#2 also told Detective Randall that Delanie was a frequent v lsitor 
to defendant's residence. He also said that Delanie hangs around Kyle Cromwell, who also 
is frequently at defendant's residence and who drives a yellow, bullet- style motorcycle (R. 
7). 
The foregoing information significantly added to the totality of circumstances 
supporting probable cause. It largely confirmed CS#l's information, through personal 
observation of another individual whose reliability as a citizen informant is not in doubt, 
about how the methamphetamine cooking equipment came and left defendant's residence 
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It confirmed both CSffl's and Si's observations that Kyle Cornwell was the 
methamphetamine cook, who could frequently be found at defendant's residence \nd it 
confirmed S2's prediction that paraphernalia would be found on the premises. 
In sum, the reliability of the informants was established because they variously had 
given reliable information in the past or come forward as concerned citizens, because they 
volunteered information without getting anything in return, and because all their accounts 
were mutually corroborative in describing defendant as a regular methamphetamine user and 
party to methamphetamine manufacture. 
2. The informants' multiple descriptions of defendant's 
criminal activity are sufficient to support the search warrant. 
The State readily acknowledges that the direct observations of CS# 1 and CS#2 did not, 
by themselves, provide enough detail to support a warrant. See Mulcahy, 943 P 2d at 236 C\ 
tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant observed the details personally, instead 
of simply relaying information from a third party ") However, this case presents the same 
scenario as in Deluna. In that case, a concerned family member ("CFM") informed the police 
of the defendant's criminal conduct, basing his information largely on the personal 
observations of one of his nieces. Deluna, 2001 I T App 401 at TJ2-3 Observing that the 
CFM's observations were probably not sufficient to establish probable cause, this Court noted 
that "his observations were corroborated and placed in a criminal-activity context by [his 
niece]." Id at*I19 (observing "that probable cause may be established by information given 
by multiple informants, 'even if an individual informant's information would not establish 
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probable cause if considered separately'") (quoting Singleton, 854 P 2d at 1020) 
Similarly, in this case, SI and S2 corroborated CS#l's and CS#2's information with 
personal observations of defendant's methamphetamine use and manufacture (R 6-7) As in 
Deluna, "[w ]hen considered together, the information prov ided by [CS# 1, CS^2, S1, and S2] 
was sufficiently detailed to establish probable cause that methamphetamine was being [used 
and] produced in [defendant's residence]. Id at f^ 19 
3. The detectives sufficiently confirmed the informants' information. 
Detectives Tram and Randall sufficiently corroborated information supplied by the 
informants to support probable cause. See State v Blaha, 851 P.2d at 1207-08 (confidential 
informant's information that husband had purchased narcotics at the defendant's residence 
confirmed by husband's pnor narcotics arrest and testimony as to his use of drugs by family 
member); State v Brown, 798 P.2d at 287 (identified citizen informant's tip, that marijuana 
was being grown in greenhouses on specified premises from which local children had brought 
baggies of manjuana, sufficiently corroborated by officer's v lewing the greenhouses and their 
detecting the odor of manjuana near the buildings) 
The detectives confirmed that Delanie Drake had a methamphetamine lab in the trunk 
of a car she was dnvmg by speaking with her father (R 7) He confirmed that items in the 
trunk belonged to him, that he had cleaned the trunk out, and that he had disposed of the items 
in the garbage (R. 7). Although he only identified borne of the items that were in the trunk, 
he acknowledged that there was some iodine and tubing, which based on his training and 
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experience Detective Tram knew were used in the manufacture of methamphetamine ( R 
8) The detectives did not find any contraband in the trunk (R 7) However, Detective 
Randall detected "the odor and sensations in her mouth that she associates with a 
methamphetamine lab" (R 7). 
The detectives also conducted surv eillance of defendant's residence after speaking w ith 
Delanie's father (R. 7). Confirming the information they received from him, the detectives 
found the car Mr. Drake said his daughter and Kenyon Staheh were dnving parked at 
defendant's residence until after 2 00 a m (R 7) While the detectives were conducting 
surveillance, another car stopped at defendant's residence. The passenger was an Eric 
Fjermestad, known to the detectives to be involved in the local drug culture (R. 7). 
The detectives actions to directly confirm their informants' direct observations of 
defendant's criminal activity, while not exhaustive, were sufficient. Information from Mr 
Drake, understandably tempered by an apparent wish to protect his daughter, and the 
detectives' own senses, helped confirm the existence of a clandestine drug lab that traveled 
intermittently to defendant's residence. Police surveillance of defendant's premises helped 
confirm that it was a hang out for drug users See Blaha, 851 P 2d at 1208 ("Even though 
there is no direct evidence of drug trafficking, and even though the officer's corroborating 
ev idence is not as thorough as it could have been, giv en our great deference to the magistrate * 
decision, and given the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit presented the magistrate 
with a substantial basis for determining there was a fair probability that the evidence sought 
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would be in the apartment ") 
Further, the affidavit recited additional grounds for probable cause (R 8) The trial 
court relied only on those additional allegations relating to the reliability of the informants, 
CS#1 and CS#2 (R 8, 97) However, the affidavit properly noted that Kyle Cornwell was 
known to be manufacturing methamphetamine in both Utah and Nevada and known in the 
local drug culture as a methamphetamine cook, that defendant and Grant Bangerter had 
previously been investigated concerning the manufacture of methamphetamine, and that 
several months earlier a Shirl Shane Johnson, under investigation for drug activity in the 
LaVerkm area, was seen leaving defendant's residence (R 8) See State v Brooks, 849 P 2d 
640,645 (Utah App.) (recognizing association with known drug dealers properly contnbuted 
to probable cause determination), cert denied, 860 P 2d 843 (Utah 1993) 
In sum, the affidavit sufficiently set out probable cause to support the search warrant 
4. Defendant's other claims, that the affidavit fails to link him with the 
residence sought to be searched, that it recites stale information, and 
that it lacks particularity, are without merit 
Defendant's link to the residence sought to be searched 
Defendant repeatedly claims that the affidavit fails to link him to the premises sought 
to be searched. Aplt. Br. at 7, 10-12. However, the claim is irrelevant in light ot the trial 
court's finding that there was probable cause to expect that evidence of methamphetamine use 
and manufacture would be found at the residence specifically located at 462 South 100 \\ ebt 
in St George, regardless of whom it belonged to (R 6) See Deluna, at *|13 (noting that an 
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informant's personal knowledge of precisely which apartment dweller possessed 
methamphetamine manufacturing equipment was not necessary to support a search warrant, 
since "a probable cause determination centers on the probability that ev idence of a crime u ill 
be found in a particular place") (quoting Brooks, 849 P 2d at 644). In any case, as the trial 
court observed, viewing the affidavit"4in its entirety and in a common sense fashion' leaves 
no doubt that the 'Bangerter residence' is the same as the residence identified by description 
and address as that sought to be searched" (R. 95 n 3) (citing State v Thurman, 846 P 2d 
1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993)). 
The affidavit, taken as a whole, supports the trial court's finding. See State v Trujillo, 
854 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah App. 1993) (noting that imprecise reference in affidav it to where an 
informant said he observed some drug buvs sufficiently referred to the defendant's residence 
when "fairly [] read" in "context" of other explicitly described drug buys); State v Hansen. 
732 P 2d 127,129 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (upholding warrant supported by affidavit mereK 
stating that informant had been at the defendants' apartment). 
The affidavit specifically identified "462 South 100 West in St. George, Ltah," as the 
place to be searched (R. 6). It described the premises in some detail, indicating that the 
number, "462," was painted on the front curb and was the same as on the mailbox (R 6) It 
descnbed defendant as a "white male, about 6' 01M tall and weighing around 200 pounds" (R 
6) The affidavit repeatedly refers to "the Bangerter residence" in referencing where CS-1. 
a reliable source, had observed Kyle Cornwell, and where SI, a source "very close" toCS~l. 
31 
and S2, a source "very close" to defendant's family, had personally observed defendants 
cnminal activity (R. 6). The affidavit recites that CS#2 told Detective Randall that Delanie 
frequents "the Bangerter residence," and that later the car Delanie was driving was located 
at the "Bangerter residence" (R. 7). Finally, Detective Tram's assertion that defendant had 
previously been investigated for methamphetamine manufacture and that a known 
methamphetamine trafficker was seen leaving "Mr. Bangerter's residence," while arguably 
not supportive of probable cause that methamphetamine would currently be found in 
defendant's residence, lends credence to the detective's correctly linking defendant to the 
identified premises. 
In sum, when read "in its entirety and in a common sense fashion," the affidavit 
adequately links defendant to the premises sought to be searched. 
Stateness 
Defendant claims that the information in the affidavit is stale because the affidav it does 
not recite when CS#1, SI, and S2 made their observations or reported them to Detective 
Tram. Additionally, he claims that February 2, 2000, the night the detectives spoke with VIr. 
Drake, and November 29, 1999, the night a suspected methamphetamine trafficker left 
defendant's house, do not relate to the residence sought to be searched. Aplt. Br. at 11 
Without relevant dates, defendant continues, the affidavit fails to establish probable cause. 
Aplt. Br. at 12. 
Defendant s claim fails on the plain assertions of the affidavit. The affidavit states that 
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CSf*l told Detective Tram on February 3, 2000, that SI reported to him that she had 
personally observed defendant smoke crystal methamphetamine and seen Kyle Cornwell at 
defendant's residence on January 29, 2000 (R. 6) Also, as the affidavit states and the trial 
court noted in denving defendant's motion, the detectiv es reported receiv ing information from 
their sources only the week before the affidavit was presented to the magistrate (R. 6,98) " \ 
mere passage of time does not necessarily invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant " 
State v Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989) (informant's occasional observations 
of the defendant's manjuana use over a vear and a half, although she had not been in the 
premises in the two months preceding the issuance of the warrant, was not stale information 
and reflected a continuing use supporting a fair probability that manjuana and paraphernalia 
would be found), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131 (finding 
that where informant had observed a large quantity of manjuana, there was a sufficient 
probability that some quantity would be still be present five days later when the warrant was 
issued and that *4a common-sense reading of that affidavit suggested the continuing nature of 
the drug's presence").5 
When read in a common sense fashion, the affidavit also clearly ties the detectives' 
As noted above in this brief, the tnal court, in finding the affidavit supported 
probable cause, did not rely on Detective Tram's "Additional Probable Cause," which 
included an observation of a suspected methamphetamine trafficker leaving defendant's 
residence on November 29, 1999 (R. 8, 93-101) However, the time frame of that 
observation, to the extent it indicates defendant's on-going involvement with 
methamphetamine, does not necessanly render it stale Stromberg* 783 P 2d at 57 
3} 
inquiries about Delame Drake to their surveillance of defendant's residence. The affidav it 
states: 
Mr. Drake told us he would help in any way, then told us what vehicle Kenyon 
and Delame were dnving that night, which was Februaiy 2, 2000. 
We later located the vehicle Delame and Kenyon were driving at the 
above mentioned Bangerter residence. We noticed it about 11:30 PM . . . . 
(R. 7). This recitation indicates by its syntax that the detectives contemporaneously spoke 
with Mr. Drake and then surveilled defendant's residence, all on February 2, which was only 
one day before the affidavit was drafted and presented to the magistrate (R. 9, 12). See State 
v Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1983) (holding present tense language in affidavit 
describes ongoing criminal activity and refutes contention it was based on stale information). 
In sum, defendant's claim that the affidavit recited stale information, insufficient to 
establish probable cause that evidence of methamphetamine would likely be found in his 
residence, fails. 
Particularity 
Defendant claims that the affidavit lacks particularity, reciting only "general categories 
of things" sought to be seized, with the exception of "methamphetamine/' Aplt. Br at 7-8 
"*[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the . . . things to be seized/' U.S. Const, amend. IV. However, 
"generic descriptions of property, although not favored, have been held permissible in cases 
involving contraband." Stromberg, 783 P 2d at 58 (upholding mere specification in warrant 
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of "controlled substances and drug paraphernalia" was not so broad as to offend Fourth 
Amendment's particularity requirement) (citation omitted) 
In fact, the affidavit's list of sought-after items on defendant's premises is well within 
constitutional limits See id The affidavit requested a warrant to search defendant's propertv 
for methamphetamine, methamphetamine paraphernalia and laboratory equipment, chemicals 
related to methamphetamine manufacture, and any records related to the purchase and 
possession of those items (R. 5,9) The affidav it also sought authonty to search for residencv 
papers, currency, photographic and audio records, and weapons and firearms (R 10 
"Attachment C-2"). The sought-after items are clearly and specifically identified Defendant 
cites no authonty that such an itemization is excessively broad. In sum, defendant's 
particularity claim lacks merit. 
C. Admission of the Evidence Seized in the Search was also 
Admissible under the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule. 
Even if the Court were to conclude that the affidavit did not establish probable cause, 
admission of the evidence is nevertheless justified under the good faith exceptior to the 
exclusionary rule enunciated in United States v Z.eort,468US 897, 104S Ct 3405(1984) 
The Supreme Court in Leon held that ev idence seized pursuant to a subsequently inv ahdated 
warrant is admissible in court where the officers conducting the search acted in good taith 
reliance on the warrant. Id. at 922, 104 S Ct 3420, accord State v Potter, 860 P 2d 952 
(Ltah App 1993) The Supreme Court established this good faith exception because the 
remedial objectives of the exclusionary rule - - to deter police misconduct - - are not served 
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where police reasonably rely on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate., Leon, 468 U.S. at 
918-19, 104 S. Ct. at 3418. Rather than always relying on an exception to the warrant 
requirement, officers are encouraged to seek the decision of a neutral magistrate on the matter. 
In the ordinary case, "an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-
cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. 
'[Ojnce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to 
comply with the law.'" Id. at 921, 104 S. Ct. at 3419. 
Given the Constitution's strong preference for warrants, "'searches pursuant to a 
warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness,' for 'a warrant issued by a 
magistrate normally suffices to establish' that a law enforcement officer has 'acted in good 
faith in conducting the search.'" Id. at 922, 104 S. Ct. at 3420 (citations omitted). Only 
where a defendant can establish that the officer's reliance on the warrant was not objectively 
reasonable will the good faith exception not apply. 
The Court in Leon identified four circumstances in which good faith will not be found: 
(1) "where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role," becoming in effect a 
member of the search party team; (2) where the warrant was so facially deficient, "failing to 
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized[,] that the executing officers 
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid;" (3) where the affidavit included deliberate material 
omissions or misrepresentations "that the affiant knew [were] false or would have known 
[were] false except for his reckless disregard of the truth;" and (4) where the affidavit was 
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"*so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirelv 
unreasonable/" Leon, 468 U S at 921-22, 104 S Ct at 3420-21 (citations omitted), accot J 
State v Lee, 863 P 2d 49, 55 (Utah App 1993), State \ Horton, 848 P 2d 708, 711 (Ltah 
App ), cert denied, 857 P 2d 948 (Utah 1993) 
None of the four circumstances exist here Nothing in the record suggests, nor does 
defendant intimate, that the magistrate participated in the search or otherwise abandoned his 
role as a neutral judicial officer, or that the affidavit included deliberate material omissions 
or misrepresentations. Defendant cursonly complains that the warrant failed to identify him 
with sufficient particularity to the place to be searched and the items to be seized Aplt Br 
at 7, 10-12 However, the tnal court and, presumably, the magistrate, found that reliable 
informants' repeated references to "the Bangerter residence" adequately linked defendant to 
the identified residence (R. 6-8,95 n.3). Also, defendant has failed to cite any authontv that 
the list of items sought to be searched for is so unusual in a methamphetamine investigation 
or so vague that officers could not presume the warrant to be valid. 
Finally, the affidavit in this case was not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Horton, 848 P 2d at 711 (citing 
Leon, 468 U S. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 3421) \ s explained above, a review of the affidavit 
under the totality of the circumstances reveals that the magistrate had a substantial basis to 
find probable cause The information in the affidav it was not so lacking that "no well-trained 
officer could reasonably have thought that a warrant should issue." Gates, 462 U S at 264, 
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103 S Ct at 2346 (White, J , concurnng) 
In sum, the officers relied in good faith on the search warrant See Leon, 468 US at 
926, 104 S Ct at 3422 (recognizing that a police otfice was entitled to rel> on a magistrate's 
issuance of a search warrant based on more than a "bare bones" affidavit where "thoughtful 
and competent judges [could disagree] as to the existence of probable cause") Accordingly 
even if this were a case where reasonable minds could differ, Leon, 468 US at 914, 104 S 
Ct. at 3416, admission of the evidence under the good faith exception comports with the 
constitutional "preference to be accorded to warrants " Ventresca, 380 U S at 109, 85 S Ct 
at 746 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE 
MAGISTRATE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE A FINDING 
BEFORE ISSUING THE SEARCH WARRANT THAT EVIDENCE 
OF DEFENDANT'S ILLEGAL CONDUCT COULD NOT FIRST BE 
OBTAINED BY A SUBPOENA 
Defendant's claims that the trial erred in issuing the warrant under Utah Code Ann 
§ 77-23-203 (1999) without making required findings that sought-after evidence "cannot 
be obtained by subpoena, or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, 
or altered if sought by subpoena." Aplt Br at 12-13 The claim is patently without merit 
on the plain language of the statute. 
Section 77-23-203 provides, in part 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation particularly describing the person or place to be 
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searched and the person, property, or evidence to be seized. 
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in 
the possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable 
cause shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party 
to the alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a 
finding by the magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be 
obtained by subpoena, or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, 
damaged, or altered if sought by subpoena. [Emphasis added]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-203 (1999). 
The magistrate issued a search warrant based on sufficient probable cause that 
defendant was a party to illegal conduct (R. 6). Therefore, the statute does not apply to 
this case, and the magistrate was not required to make findings concerning the availability 
of the sought-after evidence through subpoena. Additionally, the trial court correctly 
recognized the policy considerations underlying the statute, stating: 
It seems to the Court that this provision applies only when the property sought 
to be seized is not in the possession of a person for whom there is probable 
cause to believe that person is a party to criminal conduct. The clear intent of 
the statute is to protect innocent persons from unreasonable interferences with 
their lives and businesses, even when they may have possession of evidence of 
criminal conduct of other persons. [Emphasis in original]. 
(R. 99). 
On appeal, defendant neither recognizes the plain language of the statute nor disputes 
the trial court's assessment of how the statute should be applied. In sum, because the 
magistrate found sufficient probable cause that defendant was party to criminal conduct, the 
magistrate was not required to make findings that the sought-after evidence was unavailable 
through subpoena. Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
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POINXill 
THE MAGISTRATE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR ISSLLNG 
THE WARRANT WITH NO-KNOCK AUTHORITY 
Defendant argues that the affidavit failed to allege sufficient "proof that evidence 
sought to be seized "may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm 
may result to any person" to justify the issuance of the warrant with no-knock, nighttime 
authorization under Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (1999) (emphasis added). Aplt Br at1^-
16 6 Contrary to defendant's assertions, the affidavit was sufficient. 
"When [the appellate] court reviews an affidavit authorizing no-knock entry, [it does] 
so in a common sense manner, viewing its contents as a whole/' State v Rosenbaum, 845 
P 2d 962,965 (Utah App. 1993). Moreover, "[t]he criteria for issuance of no-knock searches 
found in Utah Code Annotated section 77-23-10(2) is less stringent than that required for the 
initial probable cause determination." Id. at 966 n.2 (observing that because the affiant must 
make a judgment about potential future events based on past experience, the word "mav" 
modifies the required showing to support no-knock entry).7 
Section 77-23-210 provides, in part. 
When a search warrant has been issued , the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter 
6
 Although the caption to defendant's Point IV explicitly challenges any 
justification for nighttime authorization, defendant's brief contains no discussion on that 
point Aplt Br at 13-16 
" Ltah Code Ann § 7~-23-210 (1999) is former section 77-23-10, renumbered 
1994 Laws ch 142, § 12 
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(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing 
the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the 
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm 
may result to any person if notice were given. [Emphasis added]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (1999). 
In support of no-knock, nighttime authonzation, the Detective Tram stated, "on 
oath" : 
I request that this warrant be executable day or night without notice, due to the 
fact that an approach and entry at night-time is safer for officers, suspects, and 
bystanders due to the element of surprise, and the suspected controlled 
substance could easily be destroyed, altered, concealed, or removed from the 
residence, [sic] also the hazards of unknown chemicals may be used as an act 
of deadly force by a suspect if thrown or mixed together when officers are 
detected.... 
(R. 9). Relevant to the particular danger justifying no-knock authonzation, Detective Tram 
stated: 
Also John Bangerter has a history of violence, threatening and resisting law 
enforcement, he is the leader of a Skin Head group known as the "Army of 
Israel" which is also a Chnstian Identity group. He has strong anti-government 
beliefs and has stated in the past that [he] will take the lives of government 
officials, police included, if he feels they are infringing on his constitutional 
nghts, especially the right to keep and bear arms. He stated to Det. Farnsw orth 
(in the past) that he was a fugitive from justice because he was facing a felonv 
charge and would lose his nght to bear arms which was unacceptable to him 
(Mr. Bangerter is not a fugitive at this time although, he is on supervised 
probation with Adult Probation and Parole ) He has also been known to fortify 




Defendant argues that because the affidavit fails to assert that he was pre^entlv in 
possession of firearms, that firearms had been observed at his residence, or that the 
detective's experience led him to believe that drug traffickers possess firearms, as in 
Rosenbaum, the affidavit failed to "prove" a substantial basis for no-knock authorization 
Aplt Br at 14-16 In fact, looked at in a common-sense fashion and recognizing the 
diminished standard of "proof required to justify no-knock authorization, see* e g , 
Rosenbaum, 845 P 2 at 965, 966 n 2, the affidavit establishes a potential nsk of harm to 
officers executing the search and a potential nsk that evidence would be hidden or destroyed 
comparable to that in Rosenbaum. 
In Rosenbaum, as in this case, a no-knock entry was authorized on two statutory 
grounds, the nsk that drugs might be quickly disposed of or secreted and the danger of 
physical harm from weapons believed to be in the defendant's possession. Rosenbaum. 845 
P 2d at 965-66 This court upheld the no-knock authorization even though the affidavit 
*1ack[ed] specifics as to how the cocaine could be easily destroyed, [since] the magistrate 
could easily infer that drugs hidden in locations in the house and yard might be quickly 
disposed of or secreted." Id at 966. 
In this case, after setting out his substantial training and experience in dealing with 
narcotics and street gangs, Detective Tram asserted multiple reasons for no-knock 
authorization on similar statutory grounds urged in Rosenbaum 
- entry at night-time is safer for officers, suspects, and bystanders, 
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- controlled substance could easily be destroyed, altered, concealed, or removed; 
- chemicals may be used with deadly force when officers are detected; 
- defendant has a history of violence, threatening and resisting law enforcement; 
- defendant is the leader of a Skin Head group known as the ''Army of Israel," 
which is also a Christian Identity group; 
- defendant has stated in the past that he will take the lives of government 
officials, including police, if he feels they are infringing on his constitutional 
rights, especially the right to keep and bear arms; 
- defendant has been known to fortify his dwellings to prevent police from 
executing a search warrant. 
(R. 5,8-9). 
On this showing, the trial court found, cw[u]pon review of the affidavit as a whole, and 
the numerous cases in the annotation to section [77-23-J210, this Court is satisfied that the 
requirements of section [77-23-]210 were met (R. 100). Even if the foregoing showing is 
less than in Rosenbaum, it justifies no-knock authorization when compared with the facts in 
other cases. See State v. Blaha, 851 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah App. 1993) (issuance of no-knock 
warrant upheld under former section 77-23-10(2), based on officer's assertion that narcotics 
were sought, that the occupants of the apartment sought to be searched had threatened the 
confidential informant's husband, and that the officer believed that weapons might be readilv 
available to the occupants of the apartment) (citing State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 733 (Ltah 
App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P 2d 427 (Utah 1992) ("small amount of drugs 
ordinarily found in a residential setting can be easily and quickly destroyed with even the 
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briefest notice"), Purser, 828 P 2d at 518 (approv ing no-knock, nighttime authorization w here 
officers were searching for drugs on premises where there was drug trafficking and a Mgn 
stating, "This property insured by Smith and Wesson," and informant reported that the 
defendant spoke of weapons) (citations omitted)8 
In sum, because the affidavit, viewed in a common sense fashion, articulated 
substantial grounds for believing that narcotics likely to be found on the premises would be 
destroyed or concealed and officers would be put at nsk if notice were giv en, the magistrate 
correctly issued the warrant with no-knock authority9 
s
 Additionally, defendant apparently argues that because the affidavit fails to 
adequately assert that he resided on the premises sought to be searched, any reference to 
his potential dangerousness cannot provide justification for a no-knock entry to those 
premises Aplt. Br. at 14. As discussed at Point I of this brief, the affidavit satisfactorily 
linked defendant with the residence sought to be searched. 
9
 At Point V of his brief, defendant claims that the breadth and general description 
of items identified in attachment, "C-2," to the affidavit transforms it into a 
constitutionally prohibited general warrant lacking particularity. This claim was neither 
made in defendant's written memorandum in support of his motion to quash the search 
warrant and suppress evidence, nor argued at the hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress (R. 57-67; 136:1-27). Because the claim was unpreserved in the trial court, it 
has been waived. On appeal, defendant makes no claim that the trial court's failure to 
recognize the alleged deficiency in the affidavit was plain error or that his failure should 
be excused by exceptional circumstances Therefore, the Court should decline to consider 
the claim. See State v Bryant, 965 P 2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (declining to consider 
claim unpreserved in the trial court and neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances 
urged on appeal) (citations omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court 
rm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_ day of Apnl, 2002 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General --> 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CS THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTr ;o -
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE ^^J^i^
 J? 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
In the Matter of Criminal Investigation 
.STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss ) 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
The undersigned .Affiant. Detective Chris Tram, appearing personally before me and 
having been sworn, states on oath; 
1. OFFICER IDENTIFICATION. That I am employed by the St George 
Police Department as a Peace Officer, and have been so employed since January of 1993 I have 
been a narcotics detective since November ot 1995 and I am currently assigned to the Washington 
County Drug Task Force. I have attended two eighty (80) hour Drug Academy courses 
sponsored by the Utah Police Academy, another forty (40) hour Drug Academy class sponsored 
by the D E A., a forty (40) hour Clandestine Laboratory Certification Course sponsored by the 
Utah Department of Public Safety, a forty (40) hour Clandestine Laboratory Certification Course 
sponsored by the D E.A., and within that past four years, over one hundred (100) hours of drug 
related training by the Utah Narcotics Officers Association I have also successtully completed an 
eighty (80) hour Drug Recognition Expert course sponsored by the Utah Highway Patrol and the 
National Highway Transportation Association I have also had numerous (over 50) hours of drug 
related training from the Utah Gang Investigators Association, the California Gang Investigators 
Association and the Nevada Gang Investigators Association. I also completed another 28 hours 
of training related to Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs and their drug involvement I have also been 
involved in numerous drug related investigations to include, under cover buy operations, 
clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine, street level dealing operations, marijuana grow 
operations, street level drug arrests, etc along with numerous interview and interrogation courses 
and hundreds of hours of training related to police work in general. 
I am a certified narcotics investigator for the state of Utah and I am certified by both the 
state of Utah and the D E.A. as a clandestine laboratory investigator. 
2. EVIDENCE/ITEMS TO BE SEIZED. The items for which a search warrant 
are sought are described as follows Methamphetamine, a controlled substance and it's related 
paraphernalia, laboratory equipment, and any precursors used for the manufacture of a controlled 
1 
) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
) SEARCH W A R R \ N l k C 
Criminal No. 
3 
substance Also anv records indicating po^e^ion or purchase of controlled ^>ubbtanceb 
laboratory equipment, products, components precursors or instructions commonlv associated 
with the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance, as well as items listed on 
attachment 
C-2' 
3. LOCATION OF SEARCH. I have probable cause to believe these iterm are 
on the premises described as 462 South 100 \Ve*t in St George, Utah This is a single famnv 
brick dwelling The front door of the residence faces East, there is also a second door visiole 
from the street and it faces South There is a driveway on both the North and South sides ot rhe 
residence The numbers "462" are painted on the curb in front of the residence, the same numoeri 
are also on a mail box which is in front of the residence to the left of the door that faces East 
The search shall also include all related storage areas, outbuildings locked and unlocked 
containers curtilage, vehicles associated with the occupants of the residence as well as tho^e 
persons present during the execution of the search warrant Also the abandoned" vehicles that 
are in the back yard of the residence 
Also the persons of Johnny Winston Bangerter (DOB 06-23-69) he is a white male 
about 6 OT tall and weighing around 200 pounds The person of Grant Justin Bangerter (DOB 
04-26-73) he is about 5'07" tall and weighs around 195 pounds he is also a white male 
4. GROUNDS. I have probable cause to believe these items were unlawfullv 
obtained and/or possessed, and are evidence ot the crimes of Possession of Methamphetamme a 
controlled substance, Manufacture of a Controlled Substance and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia 
5. PROBABLE CAUSE. The Washington Countv Drug Ta^k Force has been 
receiving information on the Bangerter residence from several different sources over the pa t^ 
week On Feb 3, 2000 the Task Force received information from Confidential Source (CS to be 
referred to as CS#1 from here on out) who told us that they have been told by two sources aoout 
drug activity going on in the above mentioned residence The CS told us that they were told bv a 
person very close to them that the person went nto the Bangerter residence to lend them some 
property When this person came back to the CS thev told the CS that thev were all (meaning 
the Bangerters and the people with tnem m the residence) smoking 'glass' m the residence ana 
that there was a lot of glass at the residence (Gla^s i^  a common street name for a more refined 
smokeable form of crystal methamphetamine ) Tne person also told the CS that there was 
another man in visiting the Bangerter residence ov the name of Kyle Cornwell The above 
mentioned incident took place on Saturday January 29 2000 
The second source that CS*1 got their mtormation from is a person who is very close to 
the Bangerter family This person told CS-l that thev had been in the above mentioned residence 
^ 
when a methamphetamine cook took place in the kitchen area The second source told CS= 1 t \u 
they became scared and left the residence The second source told CS*l that there was also a 'ot 
of paraphernalia all over the inside of the residence 
CS#l told us that when Kvle Cornwell is at the residence, there is a methamphetamine 
cook taking place CS^l was asked if Mr Cornwell brought the lab equipment to the residence 
We were told that he did not bring the equipment nor did he eave with it 
Det Randall also received information from a completely unrelated source whom will be 
referred to as CS^Z from here on out CS^2 told Det Randall was told that there was a 
suspected methamphetamine lab concealed in the trunk of a car that was being driven bv Delano 
Drake and Kenyon Staheli Det Randall asked CS^2 to describe the items in the trunk of the car 
and why the CS*2 thought the> were a methamphetamine lab CS*2 told Det Randall that thev 
had been "reading" up on drugs and drug labs because they know Delanie ana they knew she wa* 
involved in drugs CS#2 then went on to tell Det Randall what was in the trunk of the car CS^Z 
said there was some tubing, red phosphorus, muriatic acid, a coffee decanter with stains in it 
several containers of unknown liquids and what appeared to be flasks along with other items that 
were wrapped in plastic grocery bags which were then wrapped in masking tape There was also 
an item of clothing with a strong odor on which was described as a urine odor Det Randall was 
told that Delanie's father removed the items from the vehicle and discarded them in the trash 
(This took place after Kenyon Staheli was arrested while driving the vehicle the items were in ) 
Further CS#2 told Det Randall that Delanie frequents the Bangerter residence Thev also 
told Det Randall that Delanie hangs around a man bv the name of Kyle Cornwell who is also at 
the Bangerter residence a lot They said Mr Cornwell drives a yellow motorcycle (bullet bike 
style) 
Det Randall and I spoke with Delanie's father He explained to us that the vehicle with 
the items in the trunk belonged to him The vehicle was released to Mr Drake, who then 
proceeded to clean it out He told us that he did remove several items from the trunk We asked 
him to try to remember what the items were He told us there was a coffee pot, some tubing, a 
jug of an unknown liquid which he said may be iodine, only after I started to name of chemicais to 
sew-.: he could remember We asked if there was anv other glass ware or items he could 
remember He said no We asked where the items were He told me that he threw them into hi* 
garbage and it was picked up by the refuse people Mr Drake offered to let us search the venire 
again We looked into the trunk and did not locate any contraband Det Randall did detect the 
odor and sensations in her mouth that she associates with a methamphetamine lab Mr Drake 
told us he would help in any way, then told us what vehicle Kenvon and Delanie were driving that 
night, which was Feb 2, 2000 
We later located the vehicle Delanie and Kenvon were driving at the above mentioned 
Bangerter residence We noticed it at about 11 30PM and it did not leave until after 2 00 \M 
We also saw a vehicle make a stop at the Bangerter residence while we were conducting 
surveillance The vehicle was stopped on a traffic violation The front seat passenger was Eric 
Fjermestad, who is known by us to be involved m the local drug culture 
T 
6. ADDITIONAL PROBABLE CAUSE. Based on my training and experience 
the items described to us by CSsl, CS^Z and \lr Drake are consistent with the clandestine 
manufacture of methamphetamine Further Mr Cornwell has been the subject of more than one 
investigation in the past where he was known to be manufacturing methamphetarrune m both lr~n 
and Las Vegas, NV Mr Cornwell in a well known m the local drug culture as a 
methamohetamine cook Mr Kenyon Staheli was also on the periphery of an investigation the 
Task Force was conducting where we suspected a methamphetamine manufacture operation wa* 
taking place Also Both Johnnv and Grant Bangerter have been investigated for or suspected to 
be involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine in the past .Also John Bangerter has a 
history of violence, threatening and resisting law enforcement, he is also the leader of a Skin Head 
group known as the \Army of Israel" which is also a Christian Identity group He has strong arti 
government beliefs and has stated in the past that will take the lives of government officials police 
included, if he feels they are infringing on his constitutional rights, especially the right to keep and 
bear arms He stated to Det Farnsworth (in the past) that he was a fugitive from justice because 
he was facing a felony charge and would lose his right to bear arms which was unacceptable to 
him (Mr Bangerter is not a fugitive at this time although, he is on supervised probation with 
Adult Probation and Parole ) He-has also been known to fortify his dwellings so as to prevent the 
police from entering his residence with a search warrant 
On November 29, 1999 members of the Task Force stopped a subject by the name of Shirl 
Shane Johnson leaving Mr Bangerter's residence Mr Bangerter was with him when he was 
stopped The Task Force had previously been investigating Mr Johnson for suspected drug 
activity in the LaVerkin area When Mr Johnson was stopped, he had several cases of book 
matches in the bed of his truck When we asked what he was doing with the matches, he replied 
"They are not for what you think " When I asked him what he thought we would think about 
them, he stammered and replied 'They are not stolen property " I called the motel in Hurricane 
where the matches were from The owner told me that they were old matches I told the owner 
that Mr Johnson said he got them from a female with the last name of Gubler I also explained to 
the owner that the match books could be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine The 
owner then told me that they suspected that Ms Gubler was involved in drugs 
Also in my training and experience controlled substances and their related paraphernalia 
are often kept on someone's person I have also found that it is sometimes outbuildings and 
vehicles Failure to search the curtilage, storage areas locked and unlocked containers, vehicles 
associated with the occupants of the residence, together with the people present during the 
execution of the search warrant, will likelv result n officers missing important evidence 
CSsl has proven their self to be reliable to the Task Force in the past To reveal their 
identity would endanger them and ruin their future usefulness, further this source came to u* and 
asked for nothing in return for providing us with the information CS*2 is personally known bv 
Det Randall This person also came to Det Randall as a concerned citizen although, this person 
has never provided information in the past, thev are not involved in the drug culture and have no 
reason to provide us with false information Neitner source is being compensated in anv wav ror 
their information or assistance in this case 
4 
2 
7. STATEMENT. I believe the above and foregoing information constitute^ 
probable cause to support a search of the property for the above described items I request that 
this warrant be executable day or night and without notice, due to the fact that an approach and 
entry at night-time is safer for officers, suspects, and bystanders due to the element of surprise, 
and the suspected controlled substance could easily be destroyed, altered, concealed, or removed 
from the residence, also the hazards of unknown chemicals may be used as an act of deadly force 
by a suspect if thrown or mixed together when officers are detected The cover of darkness may 
also aid in providing for officers safety by delaying the occupants of the above address from 
detecting the approach of the officers prior to entry and providing "cover" should the occupants 
choose to employ violent measures to protect their laboratory and or their controlled substance 
DATE_j. Feb ZooQ TIME ZUL? /i 
Signature of Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date and time shown above 
I certify that this transcription is cerrect 
DATE 3/vJrCd TIME lHU 
)[STRICT COURT JUDGE 
T 
ATTACHMENT "C-2" 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
SEARCH WARRANT / AFFIDAVIT 
CONTESTED 
1 Methamphetamine, a crystalline white or yellow powder in solid, rock, or liquid formfa 
controlled substance) 
2 Packaging materials, to include scales, plastic bags, tape, paper bmdles cut into squares t n 
foil, and heat sealers 
3 Drug paraphernalia, to include syringes, spoons, cotton balls, mirrors, razor blades, stra*s 
pipes, light bulbs, and any material used as a "cutting agent" 
4 Residency papers, to include utility receipts and or bills, rental agreements lease, articles 
showing occupancy of the premises or ownership of the premises or automobiles 
5 U S currency, believed to be in the close proximity to the drugs or produced from the sale of 
drugs being searched for, or believed to be used for the purpose of buying drugs 
6 Drug records, to include* price lists, amounts sold, times, dates, amounts purchased, dr-u 
indebtedness, names and phone numbers of buyers/sellers, and meeting places 
7 Telephonic equipment, to include telephones (cordless, mobile, cellular), audio and aigitai 
pagers, scanners, and any other device used to communicate for the purpose of unlawful arug 
activity 
8 Photographs, to include films, videos, pictures, cameras used to photograph unlawful 
activity, or any other audio or video records depicting unlawful drug related activity 
9 Weapons and firearms which are in close proximity to drugs, drug paraphernalia, precursor 
chemicals, and manufacture equipment, or are used to aid in the sale, use, possession, ot 
manufacture of controlled substance 
10 Manufacturing equipment; to include flasks, glassware, heating elements, tubes and hoses 
filters and filter papers, ventilation equipment, PH testers, and gas masks or breatning 
apparatuses 
11 Precursor chemicals and solvents, to include ephednne and pseudoephednne, red 
phosphorus (in powder or matchbook form), iodine crystals or liquid, Red Devil lye, acetone, 
distilled water, isopropyi alcohol, hydrocholonde, munatic acid, and any other chemicals and or 
solvents that can positively be identified as used in the manufacture of methamphetamine 
/£? 
ADDENDUM B 
'CO FEB 8 API 1 1 17 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COTOL 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff ) 
vs ) 




THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER 
Probable cause appearing from the .Affidavit m Support of Search Warrant filed herein, 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to make an immediate search of the following I 
have probable cause to believe these items are on the premises described as 462 South 100 
West in St George, Utah This is a single family brick dwelling The front door of the residence 
faces East, there is also a second door visible from the street and it faces South There is a 
dnveway on both the North and South sides of the residence The numbers **462" are painted on 
the curb in front of the residence, the same numbers are also on a mail box which is in front of tne 
residence to the left of the door that faces East 
The search shall also include all related storage areas, outbuildings, locked and unlocked 
containers, curtilage, vehicles associated with the occupants of the residence as well as those 
persons present during the execution of the search warrant .Also the "abandoned" vehicles that 
are in the back yard of the residence 
Also the persons of Johnny Winston Bangerter (DOB 06-23-69), he is a white male, 
6 
/ / 
about 601 ' tall and weighing around 200 pounds The person of Grant Justin Bangerter (D 0 3 
04-26-73) he is about 5'07" tall and weighs around 195 pounds he is also a white male 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to search for Methamphetamine, a controlled 
substance, and it's related paraphernalia, laboratory equipment, and any precursors used for the 
manufacture of a controlled substance .Also any records indicating possession or purchase of 
controlled substances, laboratory equipment, products, components, precursors, or instructions 
commonly associated with the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance, as well as 
items listed on attachment ,kC-2" 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to hold any property seized subject to further 
order of this Court. This Warrant should be executed as soon as practicable, and is void after 10 
days if not served. A verified RETURN and INVENTORY of property seized must be made 
promptly to the Court. 
This Warrant must be executed during daylight hours, after giving notice 
of authority and purpose, unless special authority is granted below 
are authorized to search DAY or NIGHT 
are authorized to search WITHOUT NOTICE 
DATE c ? 7 ^ A 00 TIME 2 I '. / { 
5TH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/ ^ 
ATTACHMENT T - 2 ' 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
SEARCH WARRANT / AFFIDAVIT 
CONTENTED 
1 Methamphetamine, a crystalline white or yellow powder in solid, rock, or liquid form(a 
controlled substance) 
2 Packaging materials, to include scales, plastic bags, tape, paper bindles cut into squares t<n 
foil, and heat sealers 
3 Drug paraphernalia, to include syringes, spoons, cotton balls, mirrors, razor blades, straws 
pipes, light bulbs, and any material used as a "cutting agent" 
4 Residencv papers, to include utility receipts and or bills, rental agreements / lease, articles 
showing occupancy of the premises or ownership of the premises or automobiles 
5 US currency, believed to be in the close proximity to the drugs or produced from the sale ot 
drugs being searched for, or believed to be used for the purpose of buying drugs 
6 Drug records, to include price lists, amounts sold, times, dates, amounts purchased, drug 
indebtedness, names and phone numbers of buyers* sellers, and meeting places 
7
 Telephonic equipment, to include telephones (cordless, mobile, cellular), audio and digital 
pagers, scanners, and any other device used to communicate for the purpose of unlawful drug 
activity 
8 Photographs, to include films, videos, pictures, cameras used to photograph unlawful 
activity, or any other audio or video records depicting unlawful drug related activity 
9 Weapons and firearms which are in close proximity to drugs, drug paraphernalia, precursor 
chemicals, and manufacture equipment, or are used to aid in the sale, use, possession, or 
manufacture of controlled substance 
10 Manufacturing equipment, to include flasks, glassware, heating elements, tubes and hoses, 
filters and filter papers, ventilation equipment, PH testers, and gas masks or breathing 
apparatuses 
11 Precursor chemicals and solvents, to include ephednne and pseudoephednne, red 
phosphorus (in powder or matchbook form), iodine crystals or liquid, Red Devil lye, acetone, 
distilled water, isopropyl alcohol, hydrocholonde, muriatic acid, and any other chemicals and or 
solvents that can positively be identified as used in the manufacture of methamphetamine 
/ ^ 
ADDENDUM C 
EN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT S'~ :' -
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UT.$8 FEB 8 AH ^ B 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
In the Matter of Criminal Investigation 
Defendant 
PROPERTY INVENTOR 
RECEIPT, AND RfTUR 
Criminal No. 
RECEIPT I, the officer undersigned acknowledge receiving the property described 
below, on the date and time shown, from 
Person 0,t**^v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ <f ^ » ^ ^ H < . ^ . 
Place qvzt> I O O L O s r G a d o ^ . v j -






*See attached evidence sheet(s) 
I, the officer undersigned, by whom the search 
warrant attached hereto was executed, do swear that the above mventorv 
contains a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me on the 
warrant, which I will retain in my possession subject to ord^ of the court 
Dated. , ' ^P
 A 
/? 
Officer making return 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of 
Dated: > ' ^ 'CO 
5TH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/H 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S T W F or i r ui 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRANT JUSTIN BANGERTER, 
Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN WINSTON BANGERTER, 
Defendant. 
These cases came before the Court on Defendants' Motions to Quash Search Warrant and 
Suppress Evidence.1 Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motions The Court heard 
i nl nyumenl mi luiie I ''nun unl h n ik iln MMIII i niiilci IIIMMMIKMII 
The motions challenge the validity of a search warrant issued on February 3, 2000 S ' ' .-c 
Defendants' motions and memoranda are virtually identical, and it appears that one is a slightly-edited 
version of the other 
RULING ON MOTIONS TO 
QUASH SEARCH WARRANT 
AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Criminal Nos. 001500167 
and 001500169 
Judge G Rand Beacham 
Q*h 
§77-23-1 et seq., when he reviewed an affidavit submitted by Detective Chris Trani of the 
Washington County Drug Task Force in support of the search warrant. Copies of the affidavit are 
attached to the Defendants' memoranda, and the original search warrant is in the file for Case No 
001500167. 
The standard for review of a magistrate's finding of probable cause for the issuance of a 
search warrant was stated in State v. Thurman, 846 P 2d 1256 (Utah 1993): 
In reviewing the magistrate's finding of probable cause to support a search warrant 
based on an affidavit, we will find the warrant invalid only if the magistrate, given the 
totality of the circumstances, lacked a "substantial basis" for determining that probable 
cause existed. . . . In conducting this review, we will consider the search warrant 
affidavit in ,Mits entirety and in a common-sense fashion'" and give "great deference" 
to the magistrate's decision. . . . The affidavit must support the magistrate's decision 
that there is a "fair probability" that evidence of the crime will be found in the place 
or places named in the warrant. 
Id at 1259-1260 (citations and footnotes omitted), see also State v. DeCorso. 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 
1999). Having fully considered the motions, arguments and relevant legal authorities, the Court rules 
as follows: 
FACTS 
The facts relevant to Defendants' motions are those stated in Detective Tram's affidavit,2 and 
must be considered in uthe totality of the circumstances," and not in a piece-meal fashion as argued 
by Defendants. The affidavit clearly identifies the evidence sought and the location and description 
of the residence sought to be searched, and it names and describes both Defendants as persons to be 
"Defendants' memoranda also recite "alleged facts"' which are purportedly taken from a police report 
about the execution of the search warrant, but which are irrele\ant to the issuance of the warrant. 
r*L± 
searched at that residence.3 The affidavit then,, states information obtained from several sources: 
1. lVDriyf Y i\l l ^ re had received inthrmaii()n from aconfidential informant ideiiuiicu 
"as UCS#1," who had proven to he meltable in the past and, who "came to us and asked for nothi^* :~ 
nliJiii Inn pint ! t J in mi i u iihi "A till I hi" iiiili iiiiiufiirnii I )ti I < it mil mnpensdU'il I HI ihr inl'i iiiii.ili in " 'in 
the day of the affidavit, CS#1 reported (a) that, five davs earlier, 'a person verv close to CSff 1 had 
personal!) observed uetendam!> and i ihei pel >uiti> MINI* * , 
residence, and (b) that one Kyle Cornwell was at the residence rQ*&» ais< er< ner. , \* i e^* - - \ 
who is very close to the Bangerter family" had personally observ ed "a methamphetamine cook"" being 
cniiiliii'U'il in ihi1 I- in lini ml ihe residence audi 'i lot uf~ paraphernalia" in the residence, although the 
date of these observations was not disclosed. CS#1 further reported that Kyle Cornwell's presence 
information was not disclosed. ' 
. 2. Kyle Cornwell was known to Detective liaiii U) he well knov%n in (lit- lucal iJ ig 
ci ilti ire as a methamphetamine cook." 
3. The Drug Task Force had .also received information from, a confidential informant 
i i -vn to Detective Randall, another member of the Drug 
TIN? 1 v-rce as a Concerned >r ;.-* *.-. - .* involved in illegal drugs. CS#2 volunteered his/her 
Defendants argue that the affidavit later uses the term "Bangerter residence" without identifying that 
residence, but the Court finds that a consideration of the affidavit as described in State v. Thurman. "in its entirety 
and in a common sense fashion," leaves no doubt that the "Bangerter residence" is the same as the residence 
identified by description and address as that sought to be searched. 
3 
information and was not compensated for it During the week prior to the affidavit4, CS#2 told 
Detective Randall (a) that one Delanie Drake, who is an acquaintance of CS#2, and one Kenvon 
Staheli had been driving a car with "a suspected methamphetamine lab concealed in the trunk " CS*2 
described the materials in the trunk, apparently from personal observation, and those matenals are 
clearly consistent with those used to produce methamphetamine CS#2 also told Detective Randall 
that Drake "frequents the Bangerter residence," that Drake uhangs around a man by the name of Kyle 
Comwell," and that Cornwell "is also at the Bangerter residence a lot." 
4 On the day before the affidavit, Detectives Trani and Randall spoke to Drake's father, 
who was the owner of the car described by CS#2 Drake's father reported that he had removed and 
discarded certain items from the trunk of the car, and his descriptions were consistent with items used 
to produce methamphetamine. Although the detectives found no such items remaining in the trunk, 
Detective Randall smelled an odor in the trunk which she associates with methamphetamine labs 
Drake's father also identified the car that Drake and Staheli were then driving. At 11 30 pm that 
night, the detectives located that car at the subject residence and observed it there until it left after 
2 00 a m on the day of the affidavit. 
5 The affidavit includes Detective Tram's recitation of defendant John Bangerter's 
reputation and history for violence, and a prior statement by such Defendant to a Drug Task Force 
member "that he was a fugitive from justice because he was facing a felony charge and would lose 
'Defendants argue that the affidavit does not state the time at which the lnformauon was given, but the 
first sentence of the "Probable Cause" secuon of the affidavit states "The Washington Countv Drug Task Force 
has been receiving information on the Bangerter residence from several different sources over the past week ' 
4 
his right to bear iarms which was unacceptable to him/'5 The affidavit concludes with Detective 
T fin IIII1 i ni'iienl si ill n i mill f p^mlinii/ the need I'm i \\<\\ i.inl In he n r i iiluMr I n nt iniuhii mil HI In ml 
notice." 
Defendants first argue that the affidavit fails to cite sufficient facts to establish the reliability 
of the confidential informants or their informatioi \. In this argument, Defendants dissect the affidavit, 
paragraph by paragraph, .and argue that each portion is insufficient to support a finding of probable 
cause. 
T 
affidavit, however,,, and to determine whether there was a "fair probabtl.*v .-. .r::anan : -
evidence of a cr ime > 01 ild be foi 11 1 i at till: i s si ib ject i esidei ice !li lthoi igii i 
did rely on information from, other persons, the reliability of the confidential nfor-^a: rs .a aCe4^_.^ 
established in the affidavit, furthermore, 1 Jdrudanits have identified no precedent for the proposition 
that an otherw ise reliable confidential informant cannot be relied upon for any information except that 
personally observed by the confidential informant. The confidential informants' veracity and 
"concerned citizen,'" so that their reliability could be assumed, and each of these reliable confidential 
informal i 
Furthermore, some of the information given by them *as confirmed or corroborated by the 
'The magistrate may also have taken judicial notice of defendant John Bange, - n^ai -s.ord in the 
Fifth District Court, and of such Defendant's statements and demonstrations of armed :~ c :c :aw 
enforcement in a news program show n on national television. 
5 
:
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 ? " : / • 
detectives' own investigation This Court finds that the magistrate had a substantial basis for relying 
on the information from the confidential informants in the affidavit 
Defendants next argue that the evidence in the affidavit was too "stale" to justify issuance of 
a search warrant 
Staleness issues usually arise when a significant lapse of time occurs between the 
discovery of information suggesting that evidence of the crime can be found at a 
particular locale and the magistrate's finding of probable cause or the execution of the 
warrant The concern is whether so much time has passed that there is no longer 
probable cause to believe that the evidence is still at the targeted locale 
State v Thurman. supra 
The confidential informants gave their information to the detectives within the week prior to 
the affidavit, and at least some of the events descnbed took place within that time The detectives 
also had investigated and acquired corroborating information within 24 hours of submitting the 
affidavit Other information was known to the detectives from past expenence with the persons 
identified by the confidential informants Viewing the affidavit in its entirety and in a common-sense 
fashion, this Court finds no significant lapse of time and concludes that the affidavit sufficiently 
supports a finding that a fair probability existed that evidence of methamphetamine use and/or 
production would exist at the subject location 
Defendants further argue that the magistrate failed to make the findings required by Utah 
Code Ann §77-23-203(2), which provides, with emphasis added 
If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in the possession 
of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause shown to the 
magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the alleged illegal 
conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by the magistrate that 
the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena, or that such 
6 
x- r 
' evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if sought by subpoena. 
If such a finding is made and a search warrant issued, the magistrate shall direct upon 
the warrant such conditions that reasonably afford protection of the following 
interests of the person or entity in possession of such evidence 
(a) protection against unreasonable interference with normal busi nes"», 
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential 
sources of information; or 
(c) protection against prior 
protected rights. 
It seems to the Court that this prov ision applies only when the property sought to seized, is 
not in the possession of a person f* 
to criminal conduct. The clear intent of the statute is to protect innocent persons from unreasonable 
interferences with their lives and businesses, even when they may have possession of evidence of 
nrninal , T J L ' l "hn IMT.IIM1. In the affidavit challenged by Defendants, the evidence is 
sutlicient; to establish probable cause to believe that Defendants were directly involved in the use of 
a contr .-
controlled substance in Defendants* residence. Consequent!), Section 2:" • *Z) does not apply to such 
a situation 
Defendants argue that the affidavit contains insufficient grounds for the issuance of a "no-
knock" warrant.6 The law regarding this issue is codified in Utah Code \m i„ § I " 23 210, > 1 i icl i 
pr Dvides: : 
Defendants also bnefly mentioned the "-day or night provision,, of the search, warrant but did not put sue 
auv argument against tftis provision 
7 
?? 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the warrant may 
use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter* 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response 
or he is not admitted with reasonable promptness, or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate 
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give 
notice The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, 
that the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice were 
given 
Upon review of the affidavit as a whole, and the numerous cases in the annotation to Section 210, 
this Court is satisfied that the requirements of Section 210 were met. 
Finally, the motion of defendant John Bangerter also requests the suppression of statements 
apparently made by that Defendant upon his arrest Although that Defendant' s memorandum includes 
what is purported to be a portion of a police report about the execution of the warrant, neither the 
police report nor anything else in the memorandum identifies any statement of Defendant or any 
specific circumstances under which such a statement may have been made The Court finds no factual 
basis for consideration of this portion of the motion Defendant's legal arguments are, therefore, 
insufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the magistrate who issued the warrant for the 
subject residence lacked a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed Upon 
consideration of the entirety of the affidavit in support of the warrant, reading it in a common sense 
fashion, and giving the appropriate ugreat deference" to the magistrate's decision, this Court finds 
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that the affidavit demonstrates that there was a fair probability that evidence of use and/or 
riMniifrfotnif nl'illfL!,,')! ilniys wmiU lie found at the residence identified in the affidavit. 
Accordingly, Defendants' motions are denied. 
I » A I T D l l u s l e ^ - 1 . 1 v Hi Inly '(Mill 
c y ^ u>vg[ ffisfcfcXy^Q^^ 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
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